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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
and financial institutions justifies an articulated judicial pro-
nouncement strictly limiting the holder-in-due-course defense in
consumer sales paper transactions. This judicial declaration should
provide that any one of certain minimal facts indicating a finan-
cer-seller relationship constitutes a prima facie, but rebuttable
showing sufficient to the financer the right to assert the defense of
a holder in due course against the consumer. Traditionally it
has been argued that such a strict test would limit the need-
ed free movement of commercial paper. While such an argument
might be reasonable in strictly commercial transactions, there is
no great need for negotiable paper in the area of consumer sales.
The many states that have eliminated negotiability in consumer
sales by legislative act have recognized that financial institutions
that have to take contractual obligations subject to buyer defenses
must screen sellers, and, to a great extent, refuse financing to
those who engage in fraudulent marketing techniques.
Daniel Foster Hedges
Criminal Law-The Chronic Alcoholic Vs.
The Public Drunkenness Statute
But I shall perhaps best convey to the reader an idea
of the entire perversion of thought which exists among this
extraordinary people, by describing the public trial of a
man who was accused of pulmonary consumption-an of-
fense which was punished with death until quite
recently."'
The satirization of the callous punishment of the sick in Sam-
uel Butler's Erewhon (a reversal of the word "nowhere") has been
analogized to the conviction of chronic alcoholics for the crime of
public drunkenness.2 However, the ease in which the Erewhonian
1 SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON AND EREWHON REvIsITED 104 (Random House
1927).
2 Murtagh, Arrests For Public Intoxication, 35 FORDHAM L. Rv. 1, 3 (1966).
West Virginia's treatment of this offense is illustrative: "A person shall not:
(1) Appear in a public place in an intoxicated condition;
(2) Drink alcoholic liquor in a public place;
(3) Drink alcoholic liquor in a motor vehicle on any highway, street,
alley, or in a public garage;
(4) Tender a drink of alcoholic liquor to another person in a public
place;
(5) Possess alcoholic liquor in the amount in excess of one gallon, in
containers not bearing. . . .W. VA. CoDE ch. 60, art. 6, § 39 (Michle
1966).
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court convicted a defendant for pulmonary consumption 3 belies
the difficulty non-fictious courts have experienced in determing
the chronic alcoholic's susceptibility to public drunkenness statutes.
Moreover, the recent judicial consideration of the chronic alco-
holic-public drunkenness problem, in itself, indicates an evolving
sensitivity to the alcoholic's plight. Nevertheless, the complexity in
resolving the question of chronic alcoholism as a defense to public
drunkenness is demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court's
decision of Powell v. Texas.4 Although the sharply divided Court
in Powell refused to nullify a chronic alcoholic's conviction for
public drunknness, this result may have been contingent upon the
lack of a sufficient evidentiary demonstration. 6
In 1966 Powell was convicted of public drunkenness and fined
twenty dollars.7 On appeal, a trial de novo deviated from the lower
court's decision only in the amount of the fine (which was in-
3 Finding that the evidence of the defendant's disease compelled convic-
tion, the Erewhonian court indicated it would impose unhesitantly its most
severe punishment: "Lastly, I should point out that even though the jury
had acquitted you-a supposition that I cannot seriously entertain-I should
have felt it my duty to inflict a sentence hardly less severe than that which I
must pass at present; for the more you had been found guiltless of the crime
imputed to you, the more you would have been found guilty of one hardly
less heinous-I mean the crime of having been maligned unjustly.
I do not hesitate therefore to sentence you to imprisonment, with hard
labor, for the rest of your miserable existence." SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON AND
EREWHON REvisrrED 106, 108, 110 (Random House 1927).
4392 U.S. 514 (1968). The alcoholism issue was first tended to the
Court in the case of Budd v. California, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 909 (1966).
However, the case was deficient in that 1) the evidence of alcoholism was in-
conclusive; 2) the certiorari petition was filed after the period for direct appeal
had expired 3) the lower court decisions were not accompanied by written opin-
ions. The California Supreme Court denied Budd's habeas corpus action with-
out opinion; the only opinion of a California court was an unreported oral one
by a municipal court. The certiorari denial intimated the Powel result. Merrill,
Drunkenness And Reform of the Criminal Law, 54 VA. L. REv. 1135, 1146
(1968).
5 Powell's conviction was affirmed by a vote of five to four; however, a
majority of the Court failed to endorse any single opinion. Mr. Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Messr. Justice S. Warren, Black, and Harlan, wrote the Court's
decision. A dissenting opinion was submitted by Mr. Justice Fortas with whom
Messr. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart joined. Mr. Justice Black,joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, drafted a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice
White, concurring only in the result reached by Mr. Justice Marshall, wrote
a separate opinion.
oSee Merrill, Drunkenness And Reform of The Criminal Law 54 VA. L.
Rrv. 1135, 1150 (1968).
7TExAs PENAL CODE art. 477 (1952) states that "whoever shall get drunk
or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place or at any private
house except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars."
Powell's familiarity with the language of this statute was indicated by some
one hundred convictions for its violation. His twelve dollar a week income,
derived from a tavern shoe shine job, was expended in the purchase of
wine. Powell v. Texas, 392 US. 514, 555 (1968).
"1971]
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creased to fifty dollars). However, this pecuniary setback was
ameliorated by the court's factual conclusion:
1) chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys the afflicted
person's will to resist the constant, excessive use of alcohol, 2) a
chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own volition
but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease; and 3) Powell
is a chronic alcoholic afflicted by the disease of chronic alcoholism.8
Although Powell asserted his public drunkenness was nonvolitional,
and the imposition of a criminal penalty constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution, 9 the trial court rejected the chronic
alcoholism defense as a matter of law.
The decision of the Court, written by Justice Marshall, deline-
ated four rationale for the affirmance of Powell's conviction.
Initially, the decision asserted that the deficiency of the trial court
record barred it from serving as the springboard for both the trial
court's findings of fact and the formulation of a new constitutional
principle." This defiency was marked by two handicaps-a perfunc-
tory evidentary presentation' and an ambiguous concept of the
s Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 514 (1968).
9 "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. Powell's contention
that his public drunkenness conviction violated the eighth amendment was bas-
ed on the Court's decision of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Robinson dealt with the validity of a California statute which sanctioned a
misdemeanor penalty for a person's addiction to the use of narcotics, CAL
HEALTH and SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1961). The Court held that a state law
which punished merely the status of narcotic addiction constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
This statute, therefore, is not which punishes a person for the use
of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or
disorderly behavior resulting from their administration. It is not a
law which even purports to provide or require medical treatment.
Rather, we deal with a statute which makes the status of narcotic
addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted
at any time before he reforms.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
10 Bason, Chronic Alcoholism And Public Drunkenness-Quo Vadimus Post
Powell, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 48, 55-56 (1970).
11892 U.S. at 521.
12 The Court dismissed the findings as a house of straw:
We know very little about the circumstances surrounding the
drinking bout which resulted in this conviction, or about Leroy
Powell's drinking problem, or indeed about alcoholism itself. The
trial hardly reflects the sharp legal and evidentiarv clash between
fully prepared adversary litigants which is traditionally expected in
major constitutional cases. The State put on only one witness, the
arresting officer. The defense put on three-a policeman who testified
to appellant's long history of arrests for public drunknessess, the
psychiatrist, and appellant himself.
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disease of alcoholism.13 Secondly, the decision stated the recogni-
tion of the chronic alcoholism defense might impose on the
Id. at 521-22.
The dissent countered:
I do not understand the relevance of our knowing "very little
about the circumstances surrounding the drinking bout which resulted
in this conviction or about Leroy Powell's drinking problem." (Opin-
ion of MARSHALL J., ante, at 521-522). We do not "traditionally" sit
as trial court, much less as a finder of fact. I submit that we must ac-
cept the findings of the trial court as they were made and not as the
members of this Court would have made them had they sat .as triers of
fact. I would add, lest I create a misunderstanding, that I do not suggest
in this opinion that Leroy Powell had a constitutional right, based
upon the evidence adduced at his trial, to the findings of fact that
were made by the county court; only that once such findings were
in fact made, it became the duty of the trial court to apply the rele-
vant legal principles and to declare that appellant's conviction would
be constitutionally invalid.
I confess, too, that I do not understand the relevance of our
knowing very little "about alcoholism itself," given what we do not
know-that findings such as those made in this case are, in the view
of competent medical authorities, perfectly plausible.
Id. at 557-58, n.l.
13 392 U.S. at 524. Relying on JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT Op
ALCOHOLISM (1960), Mr. Justice Marshall asserted the existence of a know-
ledge gap concerning the character of alcoholism:
Furthermore, the inescapable fact is that there is no agreement
among members of the medical profession about what it means to say
that "alcoholism" is a "disease." One of the principal works in this
field states that the major difficulty in articulating a "disease con-
cept of alcoholism" is that "alcoholism has too many definitions and
disease has practically none." This same author concludes that "a dis-
ease is what the medical profession recognizes as such!" In other words,
there is widespread agreement today that "alcoholism" is a disease,
for the simple reason that the medical profession has concluded that it
should attempt to treat those who have drinking problems. There the
agreement stops. Debate rages within the medical profession as to
whether "alcoholism" is a separate "disease" in any meaningful bio-
chemical, physiological or psychological sense, or whether it represents
one peculiar manifestation in some individuals of underlying psy-
chiatric disorders.
rd. at 522.
The quoted remarks, placed into the context of Jellinek's monograph,
perhaps suggest a milder connotation:
Pointing out this lack of definition of disease by no means involves
a reproach. The splendid progress of medicine shows that branch of
the sciences can function extremely well without such a definition.
Physicians know what belongs in their realm.
It comes to this, that a disease is what the medical profession
recogniza as such (emphasis not added). The fact that they are not
able to explain the nature of a condition does not constitute proof
that it is not an illness. There are many instances in the history of
medicine of diseases whose nature was unknown for many years.
The nature of some is still unknown, but they are nevertheless un-
questionably medical problems. . . The current majority opinion to
which the present writer subscribes and subscribed before it was a
majority opinion, is that anomalous forms of the ingestion of narcotics
and alcohol, such as drinking with loss of control and physical depen-
dence, are caused by physiopathological processes and constitute
diseases.
1971]
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alcoholic a more severe sanction because of inadequacies in alcoho-
lic rehabilitation programs.14 Moreover, Justice Marshall suggested
the criminal sanction may have deterred public drunkenness be-
cause a "high percentage of American alcoholics conceal their
drinking problems, not merely by avoiding public displays of in-
toxication but also by shunning all forms of treatment."
(emphasis added).15 Fearing the formulation of a constitutional
doctrine of criminal responsibility, the decision expressed anxiety
that the recognition of the chronic alcoholic's exemption from
JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 12 40 (1960).
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.8 (1962), the Court apparently was
less troubled with this concept, quoting the following statement from the ap-
pellee's brief: "Of course it is generally conceded that a narcotic addict,
particularly one addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state of mental and
physical illness. So is an alcoholic."
For discussion of the "disease concept of alcoholism" and its relation to
the criminal law see: Beims, The Law's Approach To Alcohol Addiction:
Satisfactory?, 8 WAsHBURN L.J. 59 (1968); Fingarette, The Perils Of Powell:
In Search Of A Factual Foundation for the Disease Concept Of Alcoholism,
83 H~Auv. L REv. 793 (1970); Hutt. Recent Forensic Developments In the Field
Of Alcoholism, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 343 (1967); Slovenko, Alcoholism And
The Criminal Law, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 269 (1967); Szasz, Alcoholism A Socio-
Ethical Perspective, 6 WASHBURN L. J. 255 (1967); Tao, Legal Problems of
Alcoholosm, 37 FORDHAM L. RE-. 405 (1969).
14But before we condemn the present practice across-the-board,
perhaps we ought to be able to point to some clear promise of a better
world for these unfortunate people. Unfortunately, no such promise
has yet been forthcoming. If, in addition to the absence of a coherent
approach to the problem of treatment, we consider the almost com-
plete absence of facilities and manpower for the implementation
of a rehabilitation program, it is difficult to say in the present con-
text that the criminal process is utterly lacking in social value. This
Court has never held that anything in the Constitution required that
penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilita-
tive effects, and it can hardly be said with assurance that incarcera-
tion serves such purposes any better for the general run of criminal
than it does for public drunks.
392 U.S. at 530.
The force of this argument should be mitigated by the enactment of the
"COMPREHENSIVE ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1970." 84 Stat. 1848. Authorized $300 million for fiscal
years 1971-73, this act establishes federal aid to states and local organizations
for the development of alcoholism treatment and rehabilitation programs.
15 392 U.S. at 530. "Quite probably this deterrent effect can be largely
attributed to the harsh moral attitude which our society has traditionally
taken toward intoxication and the shame which we have associated with
alcoholism. Criminal conviction represents the degrading public revelation of
what Anglo-American society has long condemed as a moral defect, and the
existence of criminal sanctions may serve to reinforce this cultural taboo, just
as we presume it serves to reinforce other, stronger feelings against murder,
rape, theft, and other forms of antisocial conduct.
Obviously, chronic alcoholics have not been deterred from drinking to
excess by the existence of criminal sanctions against public drunkenness. But
all those who violate penal laws of any kind are by definition undeterred." Id.
at 531.
[Vol. 73
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public drunkenness statutes would be extended to produce a radi-
cal dilution of the standards of criminal responsibility.1 6
The Court was able to avoid these difficulties by declaring
Powell fell outside the scope of the Robinson v. California hold-
ing.17 Powell's situation was distinguishable because rather than
16 Id. at 534. Justice Marshall dreaded the possibility that a chronic al-
coholic's immunity from public drunkenness might "snowball" into a com-
plete exemption from criminal responsibility. Yet, both the dissent of Justice
Fortas and the opinion of Justice White refuted this apprehension. The dis-
sent asserted a chronic alcoholic's immunity from criminal sanctions would be
restricted to a behavioral condition "symptomatic of the disease of chronic
alcoholism" namely, the act of public drunkenness. Id. at 558-59. Justice
White's opinion stated the chronic alcoholism defense to public drunkenness
would not have a "wide impact" beyond the alcoholism problem. Id. at 552 n.4.
Justice White discounted "radical consequences" from a reversal of Powell's
conviction because only the chronic alcoholic could claim exemption from
public drunkeness statutes, for only the disease of chronic alcoholism would
compel one both to drink and to appear in public because excessive intoxica-
tion had dispossessed one of his mental faculties. Id. "When the test is thus
narrowly formulated, chronic alcoholism would constitute a defense to the
crime of public drunkenness, and probably not to any other crime. For there
is nothing to indicate, and it is contrary to common knowledge and common
sense to say, that chronic alcoholism creates any compulsion 'symptomatic of
the disease of alcoholism' to assault, to steal, to rob, or to commit any other
crime." Bason, Chronic Alcoholism and Public Drunkenness-Quo Vadimus
Post Powell, 19 AM. L. Rxv. 48, 58-9 (1970). In Salzman v. U.S., 405 F.2d 358, 361,
862, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1968) dependant alleged two points of error concerning his
chronic alcoholism defense to a robbery charge. In response to Salzman's argu-
ment that the trial judge's charge failed to distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary alcoholism, the court stated that the defendant's failure to object
on this ground to the given instruction, which explained chronic alcoholism
was to be considered in the determination of ability to form specific intent,
precluded a consideration of that point in the absence of plain error. The
court also rejected Salzman's contention that chronic alcoholism may be a
defense to a specific intent crime whose commission was a product of the
alcoholism. This rejection was based on an absence of evidence barring the
trial judge from formulating an instruction on this theory. The court stated
that chronic alcoholism, except in the public drunkenness situation, was not
per se evidence of a mental disease unless such evidence demonstrated a loss of
control in contexts other than drinking. A separate opinion by Judge Skelly
Wright asserted chronic alcoholism should be a defense to criminal responsi-
bility if the evidence demonstrated his conduct was a product of that disease.
This showing would then result in the defendant's commitment of an appro-
priate treatment facility. In Roberts v. State, 41 Wis.2d 537, 164 N.W.2d 525
(1969), the alcoholic defendant contended his disease determined his conduct.
In rejecting this argument the court held the defendant's shooting of another
person was not a characteristic of a chronic alcoholism pattern nor sympto-
matic of the disease. Moreover, the court held the evidence did not demon-
strate an addiction to alcohol. Id. at 528, 529. U.S. v. Malafronte, 357 F.2d 629
(2nd Gir. 1966), the court granted a new trial on the theory that the defen-
dant's chronic alcoholism could preclude a capacity to understand his con-
duct. Such an incapacity would fall within the scope of the "irresistible im-
pulse" insanity test.
17 392 U.S. at 532. "Whatever may be the merits of such a doctrine of
criminal responsibility (namely, the Powell dissent's contention that Robinson
underscored the principle that Eclriminal penalities may not be inflicted upon
a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change." Id. at 567.), it
surely cannot be said to follow from Robinson. The entire thrust of Robinson's
1971]
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interpretation. of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal
penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has
engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or er-
haps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus." Id. at
533.
An article of L.S. Tao, Psychiatry and the Utility of the Traditional
Criminal Law Approach to Drunkenness Offenses," 57 GEOaGETOWN L.J. 818
(1969) stated that public intoxication should be considered a strict liability
offense; thus negating the concern with the mens rea aspect. Tao related the
"voluntariness of an act" with a crime's actus reus, thus limiting the mens rea
concept to an actor's subjective mental state at the time of the criminal con-
duct. Voluntariness was defined as an awareness of one's physical actions.
Thus, an act committed under the influence of a disease, e.g., schizophrenia,
lacked both mens rea and actus reus. The involuntariness (lack of actus reus)
will exempt one from criminal responsibility including strict liability; but,
the absence of mens rea will not preclude inclusion within the strict liability
offense. "Thus, involuntariness can never be the basis for criminal liability."
Id. at 822.
The common denominator in many drinking offenses is the commission of
the offense in a public place. However, the mens rea is not required because
the intent words of "knowingly" or "willfully" are usually omitted,
indicting strict liability. In public drunkenness offenses, the actus reus is the
appearance in a public place-and such an act" implies a minimum degree of
consclousness of one's bodily movements and voluntariness associated with
the act." Id. Without this degree of consciousness the law could punish sleep-
walking. Drunkenness convictions were affirmed in Powell and Seattle v.
Hill, 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435, P.2d 692 (1967) (discussed infra) because the evi-
dence demonstrating involuntary acts was inadequate while in Driver v. Hen-
nant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), and Easter v. D.C., 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir.
1966), (discussed infra) the voluntary aspect was not shown beyond a reason-
able doubt.
"For if drinking is compelled by a disease, then, there is no free choice,
just as there is none in the case of mental disease. Voluntariness cannot exist
where there is no free choice. In the absence of voluntariness there is no actus
reus." Id at 823-4. Yet, Tao favored retention of the criminal sanctions to deter
people who are not under the compulsion of a disease.
In Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), the Washington
Supreme Court included chronic alcoholics within the scope of a public drunk-
enness ordinance. In a split decision the majority seems to adopt the White
theory from Powell in declaring the defendant's history of sustained sobriety
(one period of 18 months after leaving a sanatorium and his admission that he
did not feel compelled to drink) established "substantial volitional control"
and thus, the actus reus of the public drunkeness prohibition was satisfied.
Id. at 698. The dissent felt the statements from the expert testimony that
temporary periods of sobriety do not render the chronic alcoholic's drinking
voluntary because he will eventually return to drinking and that public
appearance by chronic alcoholics is symptomatic of alcoholism refute the
majority's position. Id. at 705, 706. Interpreting Robinson v. Cal. as prohibiting
a disease status to be labeled a criminal offense, the dissent stated that deci-
sion should exempt chronic alcoholics from public drunkenness convictions.
Id. at 708-709. The dissent asserted chronic alcoholism would constitute a
defense to public drunkenness because the required act was involuntarily com-
pelled by his alcoholic addition, thus precluding the commission of a volun-
tary act, an actus reus. Id. at 711.
But see, Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. VA. L. REv.
54, 67 (1955) for an analysis of West Virginia case law which concluded that
the mens rea standard should be presumed an element in all West Virginia
criminal statutes in the absense of expressed contrary legislative intent. See,
State v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. of America, 111 W. Va. 148, 161 S.E. 5
(1931). Yet, the author presumed the existence of a crime's actus reus. "Mens
rea means evil mind. It is, therefore, a psychoethical concept. The law has em-
(Vol. 73
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having been punished for the status of being a chronic alcoholic,
Powell had been convicted for behavior resulting from this status;
namely, the act of being drunk in public.1 s Thus, Robinson did
"not deal with the question of whether certain conduct cannot con-
stitutionally be punished because it [was], in some sense, involun-
tary 'or occasioned by a compulsion.' ,19 The Court reasoned the
only relevance of Robinson to Powell's criminal responsibility for
public drunkenness was its implication that the narcotic addiction
statute would punish even addiction status acquired involuntarily./
The Court asserted this relevance was insignificant because the
manner in which Robinson developed his addiction (whether vol-
untarily or involuntarily) was not indicated; and therefore Justice
Marshall found the origin of his addiction to be irrelevant.
2
'
The swing vote for Powell's conviction was registered by Justice
White, who with the four dissenting Justices accepted the rationale
that Robinson precluded punishment of a chronic alcoholic for
yielding to an irresistible compulsion to drink.-' However, Justice
White stated Powell was convicted for the different crime of public
drunkenness;- Justice White reasoned a constitutional defense
barring conviction of a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness
ployed it as a legal concept, signifying that frame of mind which accompan-
ies, and sometimes, in addition, precedes, the evil act, actus reus. (footnotes
omitted). Mueller, supra at 84.
In State v. Taft, 143 W. Va. 865, 102 S.E.2d 152 (1958), the court consider-
ed the import of the actus reus standard. In construing a statute which pro-
hibited driving an automobile while intoxicated, the court found its violation
necessarily implied an "affirmative or positive action" by the guilty driver.
The facts revealed that Taft's parked car moved three feet and collided into
another automobile. Taft contended the car's brakes were released accidentally.
The court found prejudicial an instruction which enabled a conviction for the
mere motion of the automobile because the instruction's scope would include
accidental movement.
"If a vehicle is moved by some power beyond the control of the driver, or
by accident, it is not such an affirmative or positive action on the part of the
driver as will constitute a driving of a vehicle .... Id. at 868, 102 S.E.2d at 154.
This language is arguably consistent with Tao's interpretation of the actus
reus concept.
is 892 U.S. at 582.
o Id. at 588.
20 Id. at 584.
Vid.
22 Id. "If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible complusion to use
narcotics, Robinson v. California, 870 U.S. 660, rehearing denied, 871 U.S. 905
(1962), I do not see how it can consitutionally be a crime to yield to such a
complusion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction under
a different name. Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding
criminal conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but permitting punish-
ment for running a fever or having a convulsion." 892 U.S. at 548-49.
23 892 U.S. at 549.
1971]
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could be invoked only where the alcoholic demonstrated his public
appearance was unavoidable because: 1) he was homeless with no
other available place to drink; or 2) although his drinking was
initiated in the privacy of his home, his intoxication triggered a loss
of control which culminated in a public appearance.2 4 In either
situation a nonvolitional act of getting drunk would be punished,
and such punishment would be violative of the eighth amend-
ment. However, Justice White agreed with Justice Marshall that
the Powell evidentiary record did not demonstrate either defense
requisite.2 9 Moreover, he noted the trial transcript implied that the
adoption of the trial court's fact findings was only a perfunctory
acceptance of proposals drafted by Powell's counsel.-9 Justice
White concluded the insignificance of these findings was demon-
strated by the trial court's rejection of the chronic alcoholism de-
fense; thus, the findings did not represent "a well-considered . ..
judgment."'2 s The evidence showed merely a compulsion of some
degree to drink and that he was drunk when arrested; therefore,
the evidence was insufficient because there was no demonstration
of an inability to avoid public appearances while intoxicated."9
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Fortas, believed the
evidence offered by Powell satisfied Justice White's criteria for a
chronic alcoholic's exemption from a public drunkenness charge.80
Yet, irrespective of this contention, the Powell dissent declared the
eighth amendment precluded the public drunkenness conviction of
a chronic alcoholic who was unable to resist the excessive consump-
tion of alcohol and who, under a compulsion symptomatic of alcoho-
24 Id. at 551-52. In Robinson, Justice White objected to the application of
the eighth amendment defense when the evidence failed to demonstrate that
the defendant's use of naicotics was beyond his control. 370 U.S. at 688.
25 392 U.S. at 551.
261d. at 549. "The trial court gave no reasons for its conclusion that Powell
appeared in public due to 'a complusion symptomatic of the disease of chronic
alcoholism.' "
27 Id. at 549 n.1.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 554. Justice White stated the evidence suggested that Powell could
have drunk at home and thus avoided public drunkenness. Id. at 553.
30 "1 believe these findings must fairly be read to encompass the facts
that my Brother White agrees would require reversal, that is, that for appellant
Powell, "resisting drunkenness" and "avoiding public places when intoxicated"
on the occasion in question were "impossible." Accordingly, in Mr. Justice
White's words, "[the] statute is in effect a law which bans a single act for
which [he] may not be convicted under the Eighth Amendment-the Act of
getting drunk." In my judgment, the findings amply show that "it was not
feasible for [Powell] to have made arrangements to prevent his being in public
when drunk and that his extreme drunkenness sufficiently deprived him of
his facilities on the occasion in issue." Id. at 568, n.31.
[Vol. 73
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lism, appeared in public nonvolitionally.31 Believing that Justice
Marshall had exaggerated the "definitional confusion" concerning
alcoholism, Justice Fortas maintained a "core" or rudimentary
meaning of alcoholism was accepted generally.32 This definition
termed alcoholism to be "caused and maintained by something
other than the moralfault of the alcoholic, something that, to a
greater or lesser extent depending upon the physiological or phy-
chological make-up and history of the individual, cannot be con-
trolled by him."33
Moreover, the dissent criticized the Court for its inconsistent
conclusions regarding the disease nature of alcoholism and in-
sanity.34 Finally, the dissent opposed the opinion of Justice Mar-
shall concerning the applicability of the Robinson v. California
decision. Justice Fortas stated the Robinson holding was grounded
upon an underlying principle, a "foundation of individual liber-
ty;" namely that "[criminal penalities may not be inflicted upon
a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change." 35 The
dissent conceded the Robinson narcotic addiction statute differed
from the Powell public drunkenness law on the basis that the
former deemed criminal the mere status of being an addict while
the latter prescribed the status of being intoxicated coupled with
the act of exhibiting this intoxication in a public place.36 However,
the dissent asserted the same constitutional objection pertained to
both Robinson and Powell-specifically, the punishment of condi-
tions over which Powell and Robinson had no "capacity to change
or avoid."37
A concurring opinion submitted by Justice Black (joined by
Justice Harlen), underscored a determination to avoid the
"murky problems" which would be spawned by excusing chronic
alcoholics from punishment for public drunkenness. This opin-
ion buffered its fundamental objection of a "snowballing", limit-
less extension of the defense with the contention that the reversal
of Powell's convicton would "significantly limit" state alternatives
31 Id. at 570.
321d. at 561.
33 Id.
34
"We are similarly woefully deficient in our medical, diagnostic, and
therapeutic knowledge of mental disease and the problem of insanity; but
few would urge that because of this we should totally reject the legal signifi-
cance of what we know about these phenomena." Id. at 559-60.
35Id. at 567.
s8 Id.
a7Id. at 568.
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in meeting the alcoholism problem.38 Justice Black concluded the
medical and sociological data demonstrating the disease concept
of alcoholism was a "medical critique" ill-suited for resolving a
constitutional question. 9 Justice Black maintained the criminal
confinement of chronic alcoholics could be therapeutically justi-
fied in the sense that alcoholics are removed from the streets and
provided with food, shelter and time to regain their sobriety (thus
they "at least regain their ability to keep from being run over by
automobiles in the street").40 Moreover, other functions of the
criminal law were served by the incarceration of the chronic alco-
holic: 1) the removal of the alcoholic from the public sector isola-
ted a danger to the community; and 2) the jailing of the chronic
alcoholic was an incentive to control "the frequency and location"
of his alcohol consumption. Furthermore, the jails were defended
as, at least, a comparable alternative to the civil commitment of
the alcoholic. 41 In affirming Justice Marshall's act-status interpre-
tation of Robinson v. California, Justice Black concluded the states
should not be compelled constitutionally to exclude from public
drunkenness laws a chronic alcoholic "whose action was in some
complex, psychological sense, the result of a 'compulsion' ,42
The internal conflict exhibited in the Powell decision has been
perpetuated through its interpretation in subsequent public drunk-
enness cases. The decision of Vick v. Alaska43 stated the Powell
decision precluded the chronic alcoholism defense to public drunk-
enness. 44 Sharing the apprehension of Justice Marshall in Powell,
the Alaska Supreme Court stated the rejection of the chronic alco-
holism defense was necessary to avert the chronic alcoholic's exon-
eration from a responsibility for other crimes (i.e. murder, rape)
committed while intoxicated.4 5 The Vick court also found a signi-
38 Id. at 537.
39 Id. at 538.
40 Id. at 538-39.
41 Id. at 539. "It is intolerable that an example of such terrible enormity
should be allowed to go at large unpunished. Your presence in the society of
respectable people would lead the less able-bodied to think more lightly of all
forms of illness .. " SAMUEL Bun.T, EREWHON AND EREWHON REvIsITED 108
(Random House 1927).
42 392 U.S. at 541. Irrelevant are "curious metaphysical questions as to the
origin of this or that-questions to which there would be no end were their
introduction once tolerated, and which would result in throwing the only
guilt on the tissues of the primordial cell, or on the elementary gases. There is
no question of how you came to be wicked, but only this-namely, are you
wicked or not?" Samuel Butler, supra note 41, at 107.
43 453 P.2d 345 (Alas. 1959).
44 Id. at 346.
45 Id. at 347.
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ficant evidential failure in the expert testimony concerning the na-
ture of the defendant's chronic alcoholism.46 Relying on Powell, the
Vick court noted that medical evidence failed to establish a loss of
control both in the consumption of alcohol following the alcoholic's
first drink, and in the abstention from drinking.47 Finally, the
court quoted approvingly the Powell language which denied that
current medical knowledge justified a conclusion that a chronic
alcoholic's drinking and public drunkenness was nonvolitional. 48
This same language was paraphrased in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision of Budd v. Madigan.49 In Budd, the court utilized
Powell's act-status interpretation of Robinson to affirm Budd's
public intoxication conviction. c0 The character of Budd's chronic
alcoholism failed to satify the Powell defense criteria formulated by
Justice White."
A peculiarity in the Minnesota public drunkenness statute en-
abled the court in Minnesota v. Fearon52 to uphold the chronic
alcoholism defense through statutory interpretation rather than on
a Constitutional basis. The Fearon court apparently surmounted
the Vick v. Powell evidentiary shortcomings concerning the suffi-
ciency of medical testimony.5 3 This evidentiary presentation provid-
ed a base for the court's conclusion that Fearon's public drunken-
ness was an involuntary manifestation of chronic alcoholism. Con-
struing the statute's phase, "voluntary drinking," to mean "drink-
ing by choice," the court declared the chronic alcoholic fell be-
yond the scope of the public drunkenness statute.54
Approaching Powell from a different perspective, the Minne-
sota court stated the Powell decision's absence of a majority opin-
ion, coupled with the presence of four dissenting Justices, indicated
a "substantial doubt" concerning the validity of the drunkenness
law if the chronic alcoholic were included within its scope; and
thus, the court tabbed its exclusion of the chronic alcoholic as the
"clearly constitutional" construction.5 5 In contrast to the Powell
46 Id. at 348.
47 Id. at 347.
48 Id. at 348.
49 418 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1969).
150 Id.
'l d.
52 State v. Fearon, 283 Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720 (1969). MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340-96 (1957) reads: "Every person who becomes intoxicated by voluntarily
drinking intoxicating liquors is guilty of drunkenness .. "
rs283 Minn. at 95, 166 N.W.2d at 723. "It is beyond the strength of his
will to decide whether to drink or not." Id.
54 Id. at 97, 166 N.W.2d at 724.
55 Id. at 97, 166 N.W.2d at 724.
f9711
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and Vick decisions, the Fearon court failed to express reservations
about a "snowballing" extension of the chronic alcoholic defense
to other crimes. Furthermore, the decision reasoned that Minne-
sota's recent legislation for the commitment and treatment of "in-
ebriates" manifested an implied aversion for the criminal disposi-
tion of the chronic alcoholic. 0
Statutory construction was also a rationale utilized in Easter
v. District of Columbia57 to place the chronic alcoholic beyond the
56 Id. at 100, 166 N.W.2d at 726. In discussing the Minnesota Hospitaliza-
tion and Commitment ACr. MINN. STAT. ANN. 253a01-253A21 (1971), the
Fearon court asserted that it was "inconsistent with the letter and the spirit
of this act to hold that the chronic alcoholic, the individual most obviously
an 'inebriate person' within the definition in the act, can be convicted and
sentenced to . .. jail when his condition would form the basis for commit-
ment under a statute which bars any confinement in a criminal detention
facility. The clear implications of the Hospitalization and Commitment Act
are that an inebriate person is neither a criminal nor dangerous and that his
problem is one that he cannot control." Id. at 100, 166 N.W.2d at 726.
West Virginia's counterpart to this legislation is found in the "Commit-
ment Of Inebriates And Criminally Mentally Ill., "W. VA. CODE ch. 27 art. 6,
§ 1-8 (Michie 1966) and thecreation of a Division on Alcoholism within the
Department of Mental Health. W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. IA, § 11 (Michie 1966).
The inebriate act provides for the involuntary commitment of an inebriate in
a State hospital (for a minimum of thirty days), following a determination
by a county court of a patient's inebriancy. W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. 6, § § 1, 4
(Michie 1966). West Virginia defines an "inebriate" as "anyone over the age
of eighteen years who is incapable or unfit to properly conduct himself or her-
self, or his or her affairs, or is dangerous to himself or herself or others, by
reason of periodical, frequent or constant drunkenness, induced either by
the use of alcoholic or other liquors, or opium, morphine, other narcotic
or intoxicating or stupefying substance."
W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. 1, § 4 (Michie 1966). The Division on Alcoholism
is charged with assisting in the establishment of an alcoholic treatment and
rehabilitation program. The code section creating this Division defines "alco-
holic" and "alcoholism" as follows:
1) An "alcoholic" is "any person, who chronically and habitually uses
alcoholic beverages to the extent that he has lost the power of self-
control as to the use of such beverages, or, while chronically and
habitually under the influence of alcoholic beverages, endangers public
morals, health, safety or welfare."
2) "Alcoholism" is "the condition of abnormal behavior or illness
resulting directly or indirectly from the chronic and habitual use of
alcoholic beverages." W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. 1A, § 11 (Michie 1966).
Against the background of this legislation, it may be significant to refer
to a recent Attorney General's opinion which responded to the question of
whether the Department of Mental Health was required under the langnage
of the above legislation to license privately owned institutions for the treat-
ment of alcoholism. In addressing itself to this question, the opinion inci-
dentally expressed an opinion on the issue of whether West Virginia has
recognized alcoholism as a disease with the passage of this legislation. "The
fact that the Legislature recognized alcoholism as a disease which requires
psychotherapy, and placed the responsibility upon the Department of Mental
Health to provide State facilities for the treatment of alcoholics, does not,
thereby, remove privately owned and operated alcoholic homes from the opera-
tion of Code 16-5B-1." f19 62-1 9 6 41 W. VA. A'ry GaN. REP. 813, 817.
57361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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reach of public drunkenness convictions. In Easter, the court based
its decision on an analysis of the 1947 "Rehabilition of Alcoholics
Act ' s58 which required judicial notice that the chronic alcoholic
suffered from an illness in need of medical treatment. After examin-
ing both the Act's definition of "chronic alcoholic"5 9 and the Act's
purpose,60 the court concluded the Act prohibited the conviction
of chronic alcoholics for public drunkenness. 61 This prohibition was
grounded upon the chronic alcoholic's loss of self-control when us-
ing alcohol which prevented him from exercising the necessary
mens rea for the commission of the public drunkenness offense.6 2
The Easter decision also based its holding on the constitutional
theory expounded in the Fourth Circuit case of Driver v. Hinnant,a
which held the imposition of criminality of public drunkenness
upon the chronic alcoholic violated the eighth amendment ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.
In Driver, the court found North Carolinas conviction of the
appellant, a chronic alcoholic, constituted an infringement of the
58 D.C. CODE § 24-501-14 (1967), as amended, District of Columbia Alco-
holic Rehabilitation Act of 1967, D.C. CODE § 24-514, 521-35 (Supp. 1971).
59 A "chronic alcoholic" was defined as "any person who chronically and
habitually uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that he has lost the power
of self-control as to the use of such beverages, or, while chronically and
habitually under the influence of alcoholic beverages, endangers public mor-
als, health, safety, or welfare." D.C. CODE § 24-502 (1967).
60 "The purpose of this chapter . . . is to substitute for jail sentences for
drunkenness medical and other scientific methods of treatment which will
benefit the individual involved and more fully protect the public." D.C.
CODE § 24-501 (1967).
A similar connotation may be drawn from the language establishing
the Division on Alcoholism in the West Virginia Department of Mental Health.
"The department's program for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of
alcoholics may include, when intended for such purposes, the establishment of
special clinics or wards within. . . the State hospitals under the control of
the department of mental health; . . . the construction of buildings and other
facilities; the leasing of suitable clinics, hospitals, or other facilities; and the
utilization, through contracts and otherwise, of the available services and
assistance of an professional or nonprofessional persons, groups, organiza-
tions or institutions in the development, promotion and conduct of the depart-
ment's program." W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. IA, § 11 (Michie 1966).
61361 F.2d at 52.
"It is suggested that the public nature of the intoxication adds a factor
which precludes the defense-that if suffering from the sickness is not a crime
manifesting it in a public place is. But nothing whatever indicates that Con-
gress intended to limit the scope of the Act to persons sick in privacy. It is
clear the Act was primarily concerned with persons found in public places.
... The very nature of the sickness goes where its victim goes." Id. at 52-3.
62 Id. at 52. "In the case of a chronic alcoholic Congress has dealt with his
condition so that in this jurisdiction he too cannot be held guilty of the crime
of being intoxicated because, as the Act recognizes, he has lost the power of
self-control in the use of intoxicating beverages. In his case an essential ele-
ment of criminality, where personal conduct is involved, is lacking. This
element is referred to in the law as the criminal mind." Id.
62 Id. at 53 Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F-2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
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eighth amendment because a chronic alcoholic's appearance in
public was an act symptomatic of the disease of alcoholism.0 ' Ac-
cepting the disease concept of alcoholism, the court declared a
chronic alcoholic's public drunkenness was "obviously" a symptom
of his disease. 5 In applying the Robinson v. California decision,
the Driver court discerned its applicable constitutional significance
to be that the eighth amendment precluded statutes from attach-
ing criminality to persons for being, for example, mentally ill.00
Although the Powell v. Texas decision rejected the holding of
64 "Although his misdoing objectively comprises the physical elements of a
crime, nevertheless no crime has been perpetrated because the conduct was
neither actuated by an evil intent nor accompanied with a consciousness
of wrongdoing, indispensable ingredients of a crime. Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-252, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952). Nor can his
misbehavior be penalized as a transgression of a police regulation-malum
prohibitum-necessitating no intent to do what it punishes. The alcoholic's
presence in public is not his act, for he did not will it. It may be likened to
the movements of an imbecile or a person in a dilirium of a fever. None of
them by attendance in the forbidden place defy the forbiddance."
"This conclusion does not contravene the familiar thesis that voluntary
drunkenness is no excuse for crime. The chronic alcoholic has not drunk volun-
tarily, although undoubtedly he did so originally. His excess now derives from
disease. However, our excusal of the chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecu-
tion is confined exclusively to those acts on his part which are compulsive as
symptomatic of the disease. With respect to other behavior-not characteristic
of confirmed chronic alcoholism-he would be judged as would any person
not so afflicted." Id. at 764.
Lewis v. Celebrezze, 359 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1966) relied on Driver in hold-
ing that Social Security benefits were not precluded when employment was
impossible because of claimant's chronic alcoholism. However, here the
proof did not demonstrate climant's alcoholism had reached the chronic
level.
In People v. Spinks, 61 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1967), the
court repudiated the Driver reasoning and utilized the theory that the public
drunkenness statute prohibited conduct, but did not punish for a disease. In
People v. Hoy, 3 Mich. App. 666, 143 N.W.2d 577 (Ct. App. Mich. 1966), the
court seemed oblivious to the actus reus concept in asserting the volitional
issue was irrelevant to a public drunkenness charge.
In Sweeney v. U.S., 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965), relying on Robinson, the
court stated requiring a probationer to cease using alcoholic beverages was un-
reasonable if expert testimony demonstrated probationeer's alcoholism had
eliminated his volitianal capacity to comply. See also State v. Oyler, 92 Id. 46,
436 P.2d 709 (1968). Contra, Sobota v. Willard, 247 Ore. 151, 427 P.2d 758, 759
(1967).
"Whether the forbidden conduct is the product of illness or of a character
disorder, the protection of society and the efficacy of probation both are jeo-
pardized if probation does not include at least an attempt to cause the person
to discontinue the kind of conduct which resulted in his conviction."
05 365 F.2d at 764.
6o "Robinson v. State of California, supra, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962),
sustains, if not commands, the view we take. While occupied only with a State
statute declaring drug addiction a misdemeanor, the Court in the concurrences
and dissents, as well as in the majority opinion, enunciated a doctrine en-
compassing the present case. The California statute criminally punished a
"status"--drug addiction-involuntarily assumed; the North Carolina Act
criminally punishes an involuntary symptom of a status-public intoxication.
In declaring the former violative of the Eighth Amendment, we think pari
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Driver and its application of Robinson, it has been suggested that
the results of Driver and Powell are reconciliable in that Driver
satisfied the alcoholism defense criteria delineated by Justice White
because Driver was a homeless chronic alcoholic. 67
CONCLUSION
Reliance on several of the discussed cases may enable the
formulation of an argument for the exemption of a chronic alco-
holic from the purview of the West Virginia public drunkenness
statute.0 8 The argument would be launched with the assumption
that Justice White in the Powell decision accepted its dissenting
theory that the eighth amendment precluded a chronic alcoholic's
punishment for public intoxication provided his loss of control
criteria were satisfied.69 Then, the Driver decision would be offered
as a "home-grown" recognition of both the acceptance of alcoholism
as a disease and the acceptance of the eighth amendment rationale
for the chronic alcoholism defense to public intoxication. Easter
could be utilized as a guideline for the development of the con-
tention that the West Virginia legislation concerning inebriate
commitment and the Alcoholism Division of the West Vrginia
Mental Health Department has impliedly excluded the chronic
alcoholic from public drunkenness conviction. Finally, the Powell,
Hill, Vick, and Fearon decisions would provide the evidentiary
yardsticks for a sufficient demonstration of the severity of a de-
fendant's alcoholism and of his loss of self-control in the use of
alcoholic beverages which manifests itself symptomatically in the
act of public intoxication. Yet, medical testimony which seemingly
fills every gap delineated in these four cases might fail in the at-
tainment of the desired result; for the evidentiary shortcomings
outlined by these decisions may have camouflaged the essential ob-
jection to the chronic alcoholism defense to public intoxication.
In the discussed cases, the alcoholic defendants' success in
avoiding the public drunkenness conviction has depended appar-
ently upon the presentation of a meticulously formulated medical
testimony reminiscent of the procedural complexities of common
xatione, the Robinson decision condemns the North Carolina law when ap-
plied to one in the circumstances of appellant Driver. All of the opinions
recognize the inefficacy of such a statute when it is enforced to make involun-
tary deportment a crime." Id. at 764-5.
67 Merrill, Drunkenness And Reform Of The Criminal Law, 54 VA. L. Ray.
1155, 1151 (1968).
68 W. VA. CODE ch. 60, art. 6, § 39 (Michie 1966).
69 Supra note 24.
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law pleading. Yet, these defendants' alcoholic histories and their
expert medical testimony exhibit no significant differences. Thus,
reliance upon evidentiary technicalities to reject the chronic alco-
holism defense may have revealed an intense reluctance to engage
in the revision of the precepts of criminal responsibility; according-
ly, the acceptance of the defense may have implied a belief that
these precepts would not be disturbed radically.70
Because judicial determinations regarding the approval of the
chronic alcoholism defense to public intoxication may be ground-
ed on underlying reactions to its effect on criminal responsibility,
"the evolving standards of decency" 7' in the treatment of alcohol-
ism might be more quickly realized through legislative action. Both
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice and the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delin-
quency, and Corrections in West Virginia have urged that the
crime of public drunkenness be eliminated.72 The "District of
Columbia Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act of 1967"73 and Maryland's
7o See generally, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause And
The Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 635 (1966).
71The interpretation of the eighth amendment is derived "from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.,86 (1958).
72"Drunkenness should not in itself be a criminal offense. Disorderly
and other criminal conduct accompanied by drunkenness should remain pun-
ishable as separate crimes. The implementation of this recommendation requires
the development of adequate civil detoxication procedures." PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTiCE. THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FRE SocIErY 236 (1957). "(T) he Governor's Committee has
recommended that the alcoholic be taken out of the criminal justice system."
GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON CRIME, DELINQUENCY, AND CORRECTIONS. CRME IN
WEST VIRGINIA 179 (1968).
7 D.C. CODE § 24-514, 521-35 (Supp. 1971). Amending D.C. CODE § 24-501-
14 (1967).
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, any
person who is intoxicated in public-
"(I) may be taken or sent to his home or to a public or private health
facility, or
"(2) if not taken or sent to his home or such facility under paragraph
(I), shall be taken to a detoxification center, by the commissioner.
Reasonable measures may be taken to ascertain that public trans-
portation used for such purposes shall be paid for by such person in advance.
Any intoxicated person may voluntarily come to a detoxification center for
medical attention. The medical officer in charge of a detoxification center
shall have the authority to determine whether a person shall be admitted to
such center as a patient, or whether he should be referred to another health
facility. The medical officer in charge of such center shall have the authority
to require any person admitted as a patient under this subsection to remain at
such center until he is sober and no longer incapacitated, but in any event
no longer than 72 hours after his admission as a patient. If the medical officer
concludes that such person should receive treatment at a different facility, he
shall arrange for such treatment and for transportation to that facility. A
detoxification center may provide medical services to a person who is not ad-
[Vol. 73
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"Comprehensive Intoxication and Alcoholism Control Act" 7' repre-
sent a meaningful response to the President's Commission's recom-
mendation. However, criminal sanction's remain accessible to the
chronic alcoholic under these statutes, for both prohibit disorderly
intoxication;7r and thus, most conduct included within the scope
of the public drunkenness law might also be covered through a
disorderly conduct charge.7 6 Consequently, if public drunkenness
violations can be re-labeled disorderly conduct, a community's res-
mitted as a patient. A patient in a detoxification center shall be encouraged to
consent to an intensive diagnosis for alcoholism and to treatment at the in-
patient and outpatient facilities authorized in section 3 (a) of this Act.
D.C. CODE § 25-524 (Supp. 1971).
74 MD. GEN. LAws ANN. art. 2C, § 03 (Supp. 1970)
(a) Any person who is intoxicated in a public place may be taken or
sent to his home or to a public or private health facility by the police or other
authorized personnel; provided, that the police may take reasonable measures
to ascertain that commercial transporation used for such purposes is paid
for by the person in advance.
(b) Any person who is intoxicated in a public place and either incapaci-
tated or whose health is in immediate danger, if not handled under subsection
(a), shall be taken by the police or other authorized personnel to a detoxica-
non center.
[Maryland's "Comprehensive Intoxication and Alcoholism Control Act"]
"I can tell you now that the law . . . has represented tremendous progress
in Maryland in alcoholism treatment and control . . . . Health and social
services are gradually phasing out law enforcement involvement with alcoholics:
in Baltimore City law enforcement is 65% below the level 5 years ago.
Letter from Mrs. Gertrude L. Nilsson, Coordinator, Services to Alcoholics,
Division on Alcoholism Control, Department of Mental Hygiene to James R.
Gerchow, November 2, 1970.
75 D.C. CODE § 22-1107 (1967); MD. GEN. LAws ANN. art. 27, § 122 (Supp.
1970). Moreover, both jurisdictions have enacted "disorderly while intoxicated"
statutes:
No person in the District of Columbia, whether in or on public
or private property, shall be intoxicated and endanger the safety of
himself or of any other person or of property.(b) Any person violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100 or by im.-
prisonment for not more than ninety days, or both.
(c) Any person in the District of Columbia who is intoxicated
in public and who is not conducting himself in such manner as to en-
danger the safety of himself or of any other person or of property, shall
be dealt with in accordance with section 24-524. (See note 73). D.C.
CODE § _5-123 (1967).
Drunkenness and disorderly conduct generally; habitual offenders. (A)
No person in the State of Maryland shall be intoxicated and endanger the
safety of another person or property and no person in the State of Maryland
shall be intoxicated or drink any alcoholic beverage in a public place or in
or upon public conveyance and cause a public disturbance. MD. GEN. Lws
ANN. art. 27, § 123 (Supp. 1970).
76 Hawaii has enacted a statute similar to the District of Columbia and
Maryland legislation authorizing police officers to transport intoxicated per-
sons to detoxification facilities. Act 6 f19681 HAWAII RZG. SEss. 7. Yet, such
persons remain vulnerable to prosecution "for violation of any penal law."
Id. Of the eleven specified types of behavior constituting disorderly conduct,
a publically intoxicated alcoholic would probably find himself extremely sus-
ceptible to the following provisions:
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